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The impact of education on legislative 
responsiveness in three field experiments
Jayme Neiman1*
Abstract: Three field experiments were used to investigate whether a constitu-
ent’s education level influences state legislators’ responsiveness to their request 
for assistance. Legislators were sent emails that were randomly varied as to the 
education level of the writer. Results indicate that communication from constituents 
with lower education levels receive fewer replies. Two potential explanations for the 
variation in legislative response are explored—political party and the legislator’s 
own education level. Analysis suggests that neither of these variables account for 
the response differential to the email manipulations.
Subjects: Politics & International Relations; Political Behavior and Participation; Govern-
ment; Legislative Politics; Education; Sociology of Education; Education Policy & Politics; 
Education Politics
Keywords: Legislators; field experiment; responsiveness; representation; state legislatures; 
communication; email
1. Background
Equality of political access and political influence are two of the cornerstones of what makes a demo-
cratic system representative (Butler & Broockman, 2011; Dahl, 1956; Verba, 2003). Research indicates, 
however, that there is considerable variation in who has this access and influence (e.g. Butler & 
Broockman, 2011; Fraga, 1992; Hajnal, 2009; Thernstrom, 1987), and in this paper I examine whether 
a constituent’s education level contributes to that variation, and thus to the benefits of democracy.
In order to explore this question, I focus on communication responsiveness—literally how law-
makers reply to emails sent to them from mock constituents. In a series of three field experiments, 
I sent emails to state legislators, varying the education level (both perceived and explicit) of the 
constituent email sender to look for differences in the response rates from the lawmakers. 
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Responding to email communication falls into a category of the kind of quotidian casework that 
makes up the bulk of the daily work of a state legislative office (Jewell, 1982; Keefe & Ogul, 1989).
Casework refers generally to the actions taken by legislative offices to provide a specific benefit for 
one constituent or a group of constituents. This can take the form of answering questions, assisting 
with navigating regulations, helping with benefit eligibility, or even job assistance. Though congres-
sional scholars have studied casework at the federal level (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1980; Fenno, 
1978; Fiorina, 1974, 1977; Frantzich, 1986; Mann & Wolfinger, 1980; Parker, 1986; Serra & Moon, 
1994; Yiannakis, 1981; Wagner, 2007), few have examined casework at the state legislative level.
Casework can be viewed as representation or responsiveness as these concepts are conceptual-
ized by Pitkin (1967/1972), and Eulau and Karps (1977). Specifically, casework embodies Pitkin’s con-
cept of substantive representation and Eulau and Karps’ service responsiveness model: the actions 
that representatives take on behalf of or in the interest of the represented. In this way casework is 
foundational to democracy—the “re” in representation and responsiveness.
In addition to being essential for the constituency and for representative democracy itself, case-
work is important to the elected officials themselves. Legislators do constituent casework in order to 
claim credit for helping their people (Mayhew, 1974). Essentially, if a constituent knows that the 
lawmaker was the one that helped them with their problem or inquiry, the more likely they are to see 
that lawmaker as a helpful and effective public official (Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1974). And, of course, 
the more someone sees a lawmaker as helpful and effective, the more likely they are to vote for that 
person and to contribute money toward that person’s future campaigns. Even the most benevolent 
of lawmakers generally is motivated to keep their job and to take actions to do so.
Lawmakers, however, cannot give everyone all of their attention all of the time. It is important to 
note that existing research has found significant variation in the amount of casework that state 
legislative offices perform. This suggests meaningful variation in this particular form of representa-
tion or responsiveness. There have been many attempts to explain this variation, including individual 
factors such as personal enjoyment (Rosenthal, 1981), developing relationships with constituents 
(Diamond, 1977), electoral advantage (Patterson, 1990; Rosenthal, 1993) and political ideology 
(Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Johannes, 1984). State and district factors, such as urbanization 
(Johannes, 1984), institutional culture (Jewell, 1982), and legislative professionalism (Jewell, 1982; 
Patterson, 1990; Rosenthal, 1993) have also been shown to have an effect.
There may be another concept at play here—statistical discrimination (Butler & Broockman, 
2011). The idea that legislators have a pretty good idea of who will and who will not be a supporter 
come election time has been a popular theme in the research on legislative behavior since the 
1970s. For example wealthier Americans tend to vote at higher rates than poorer ones, and Larry 
Bartels (2002) found that U.S. Senators are “vastly more responsive to the views of affluent constitu-
ents than to constituents of modest means” (21). In 2005, Martin Gilens found similar, possibly even 
more disheartening, results—policy outcomes vary with the preferences of the richest Americans, 
but do not reflect at all the preferences of poor or middle-income ones (Gilens, 2005).
This sort of preferential treatment can be broken down even further. Butler and Broockman (2011) 
noted that black voters tend to cast their votes for the Democratic candidate nearly all of the time, 
and thus hypothesized that a rational Republican legislator would be more responsive to a white 
constituent than a black one. The results of their study did, in fact, indicate that this was the case. 
Further, they found that when the black “constituent” specified that he was a Republican, this effect 
disappeared. These results show that legislators may be relying on racial cues when deciding where 
to allocate their attention and resources.
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Responsiveness in this sense has real-world implications that have been documented in the litera-
ture—there is evidence that when historically underserved groups, such as women and racial mi-
norities, perceive their representatives as being responsive they vote at higher rates (Chattopadhyay 
& Duflo, 2004; Griffin & Keane, 2006). The flip of this, unfortunately, is that when lawmakers do not 
respond to these constituents in the same way as they do to their white male counterparts, individu-
als who were already more likely to stay home on election day become even more likely to do so 
because of their negative experience.
2. Hypotheses
I propose that these mechanisms for variation in responsiveness may hold true for education level 
as well. It is commonly understood that individuals with more education participate at higher rates 
(Berinsky & Lenz, 2011; Campbell, 1980; Hillygus, 2005; Nie et al., 1996; Schlozman, 2002; Wolfinger 
& Rosenstone, 1980). It is not entirely clear why this relationship is so strong, and many theories 
have been posited. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue that education “imparts the knowledge 
and skills most essential” (136) to understanding politics and government. On the same note, Verba 
et al. (1995) offer the idea that education increases civic skills and that those skills enable participa-
tion. Conversely, Kam and Palmer (2008) propose that rather than knowledge, increased educa-
tional attainment endows pre-adult experiences that create particular dispositions and a particular 
status that makes participation more likely.
More highly educated individuals are more likely to participate in all areas of politics, but of par-
ticular interest to lawmakers is voting and contributing monetarily to campaigns. If we continue to 
trust that Mayhew was correct and that legislators act toward being reelected, it follows that they 
may devote a disproportionate amount of time and attention to the people who will be more likely 
to support them. Consequently, I hypothesize that legislators will be more responsive to constitu-
ents who are perceived to have more education (Hypothesis 1).
Another established mechanism for explaining variation in responsiveness that might be applica-
ble here is political party. In addition to making one more likely to participate, higher education 
levels are correlated with political liberalism and identification with the Democratic Party (Party 
Identification Trends, 2014). Among those with a high school diploma or less, 31% identified as 
Democratic while only 22% identified as Republican—a difference of 9% points (others did not re-
spond or identified as Independent). Respondents with a college degree showed a larger difference, 
as 34% identified as Democratic and 24% as Republican (a 10-point difference). The biggest differ-
ence was between the parties was among those with post-graduate degrees where 38% identified 
as Democratic and only 20% as Republican, a much larger 19-point difference. Put simply, the higher 
the level of education, the bigger edge the Democrats have.
There has been notorious vitriol surrounding this correlation. While running for president in 2012 Rick 
Santorum referred to institutions of higher education as “indoctrination mills” for liberalism. That may 
be an overstatement, however studies have indeed found that professors tend to be more liberal than 
the general population (Gross & Simmons, 2007; Horowitz, 2007) and that there is a generally liberal 
campus culture and curriculum (Binder & Wood, 2013). Studies of students themselves indicate that 
they do in fact become more liberal as their years of post-secondary schooling progress (Horowitz, 
2007), though the changes are in line with non-collegiate adults between the ages of 18 and 24 (Mariani 
& Hewitt, 2008). Further, data indicates a self-selection effect, as liberal high schoolers are more likely 
than their conservative counterparts to attend college in the first place (Stoker & Jennings, 2008).
There is a clear connection between educational attainment and political party affiliation such that 
those with higher levels of education are more likely to identify as Democrats. A Republican official, 
when faced with a highly educated constituent, may be aware of the statistics and assume that 
person to not be a supporter. Accordingly, I expect Republican representatives to be more responsive 
to communication from uneducated constituents than their Democratic counterparts as they are 
more likely to hope for a chance at that individual’s vote/campaign contribution (Hypothesis 2).
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The third potential area for looking at the relationship between variation responsiveness and edu-
cation level lies in the educational attainment of the legislators themselves. In a study looking at 
gender, Phillips (1995) argues that the mere presence of women in governing bodies increases the 
representation of women in the constituency. Shared experiences and a naturally-occurring empa-
thy necessarily bestow this benefit. She argues that this principle is transferrable to other historically 
disadvantaged or underrepresented groups. I propose that those members of American society who 
have relatively lower levels of education may fit this model. Education certainly endows certain 
types of shared experiences—graduation, classes, coursework, and for many, particular social expe-
riences. Not going to college also bestows shared experiences. Those who drop out of high school 
largely miss out on the specific experiences unique to those who obtain further education. They are 
often limited in the types of jobs available to them, and tend to be overrepresented amongst those 
who do not have health insurance and who collect government benefits. They also make up a major-
ity of those Americans who became parents as teenagers.
If the relatively uneducated are, in fact, a cohesive group in terms of shared experiences and spe-
cific interests, it follows that they may be most represented by legislators who also lack extended 
education. Perhaps individual legislators who did not attend college (there are very few, if any, who 
did not complete high school in the entire country and none in my sample though there is substan-
tial variation—see Table 1 for detailed statistics) would be more sympathetic to, or at least unfazed 
by, communication from constituents who clearly lack education as well. Hypothesis 3 is, then, leg-
islators with less education themselves will be more responsive to the uneducated constituents than 
their better-educated counterparts.
Per the relevant literature, I am also including several control variables in my models. Female 
legislators tend to spend more time on constituency service than males do (Richardson & Freeman, 
1995; Thomas, 1992), so gender is included. Staff size has been found to have an effect on the time 
that an office is able to allocate to casework (Freeman & Richardson, 1994; Jewell, 1982; Patterson, 
1990; Rosenthal, 1993), so legislative professionalism/capacity is included. Senate offices, generally 
having larger staffs and budgets, tend to devote more time to constituent services than House of-
fices (Rosenthal, 1993). Finally, individual legislator’s views on government spending has been 
found to influence casework in that those who favor limited government spend less time on it (Cain 
et al., 1987; Johannes, 1984), and legislator party identification will be used as a proxy. These vari-
ables may impact overall responsiveness, however there is no specific reason to believe that they 
would affect the responsiveness to a well-educated constituent over one who is not so 
well-educated.
3. Study 1
In order to test legislative response variation and educational attainment, a sample of five state 
representatives and five state senators and their email addresses were randomly selected from the 
National Conference of State Legislators database. After attrition due to email delivery problems 
and job turnover, the data-set included 332 cases in 38 states. Table 1 presents the univariate 
Table 1. Univariate statistics for independent variables
aLegislative professionalism is measured here using the measure developed by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures. They split the states up into 5 groups based on what percent of a full-time job the legislatures require 
of their legislators. Staff capacity, which is highly correlated with full-timeness, of each legislature is also taken into 
account.
b1 = High school, 2 = Some college, 3 = Associates or equivalent degree, 4 = Bachelor’s degree, 5 = Graduate degree.
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Gender 0 (Male) 1 (Female) .330 .472
Party 0 (Dem) 1 (Rep) .520 .500
Chamber 0 (Senate) 1 (House) .490 .501
Legislative Professionalisma 1 5 2.621 .987
Education levelb 1 5 3.961
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statistics for the sample, which is broadly representative of the larger population of state legislators, 
though slightly heavy on females (t = 3.754, p < .001).
This study uses writing quality as a proxy for education level. Writing skill can serve this role rea-
sonably as there are two strong links between the two. First, having more education generally makes 
people better writers (Dowhower, 1989; Ericsson, 2006; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). Second, having 
well-developed writing skills makes individuals more likely to stay in school and attain more educa-
tion (Graham & Perin, 2007; Mattern & Shaw, 2010; Rasicot, 2012).
Two emails, each asking a simple question about voter registration, were composed—one mail of 
high quality, with no spelling or grammatical errors (Email A) and one with many errors (Email B). 
Each of the offices was sent these emails two weeks apart, with order randomly alternated and from 
generic Gmail accounts.
Each legislator was then coded for whether or not they responded to the email (and for the control 
variables). About 62% responded to the “good” email, while only around 40% responded to the 
“bad” one.1 A simple RM-ANOVA was used first in order to test for mean differences in response to 
the two emails without holding any control variables constant. This analysis shows a significant dif-
ference between the mean response rate to the well-written email (M = .62, SD = .486) and the 
poorly-written one (M = .45, SD = .498), F(1,331) = 30.526, p < .001, supporting H1.
There was no similar support however for a similar simple test of H2 or H3. A χ2 test of independ-
ence indicates that party affiliation did not affect the response rates, χ2(3, N = 332) = .563, p = .905. 
Similarly, the educational attainment of the legislators showed no effect (χ2(12, N = 332) = 17.517, 
p = .131.
In order to test the relationship between the email responses and the hypothesized variables 
while controlling for the variables that previous research indicated may influence response rate, a 
multinomial logistic regression was estimated using a categorical construction response variable 
(no response, well-written only, poorly-written only, both). The model shows a significant result, 
however, of the independent variables used, the variable driving the model is legislative capacity 
(Table 2). Only one other variable appears to be significant—the gender variable in the last column 
has a probability value of .05. While the result is in the expected direction (female legislators are 
Email B
Dear mr XXXXX
I am jakemarshall. I would like to lern to registor to vote for the next electshun. I jus moved here 
and dont know how to do stuff here. I know that importat stuff is happen in the world and I want 
to make my voice herd. Where can I go or call for signing up?




My name is Brian Johnson, and I am trying to figure out how to register to vote for the upcoming 
election. I am new to the area and unfamiliar with the institutions and procedures here. Due to 
the current antagonistic political climate, and the historic nature of the next round of elections, I 
want to make sure that I have plenty of time to register.
If you could please let me know who I should call, or where I should go to register, I would 
really appreciate it. Thank you for your time.
Best,
Brian Johnson
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more likely to have responded to both emails), it is possible that this is a statistical artifact—the 
fallout of running a large model.
This larger model allows us to see that while there was a significant difference in the response rate 
to the two emails, neither of the hypothesized variables can account for the difference. Rather, leg-
islative professionalism is the only variable that reliably indicates a significant result. This is a bit 
surprising. Previous research would lead us to expect that legislative professionalism might influ-
ence the overall response rates (Freeman & Richardson, 1994; Jewell, 1982; Patterson, 1990; 
Rosenthal, 1993), however there was nothing in these studies that would indicate this variable as 
possibly explaining a difference in response rates between the two emails.
4. Study 2
In Study 1, the poorly-written email received far fewer responses than the well-written one. It is pos-
sible however that the extreme nature of the email quality was enough to unfairly influence the re-
sults (i.e. the “good” email was too good and vice versa). In order to parse this out Study 2 ran with 
a slightly altered version of the manipulation emails (Emails C and D).
Table 2. Multinomial logistic regression predicting response to emails
Note: The contrast variable for the model is the “did not respond to either email” category.
*Significance level at p < .05.
**Significance level at p < .01.






Responded to both 
coefficient (SE)
High school −.162 (.607) −.336 (1.146) .141 (.544)
Some college −.530 (.520) .380 (.704) −.715 (.523)
Associate’s degree −19.183 (52.51) −.416 (1.149) −.980 (.694)
Bachelor’s degree −.157 (.358) .883 (.503) −.067 (.343)
Graduate degree – – –
Senate −.002 (.309) .440 (.432) −.296 (.292)
House – – –
Democrat .146 (.320) −.001 (.440) .013 (.302)
Republican – – –
Very low leg capacity −18.937 (.894)** −19.469 (1.076)** −18.956 (.680)**
Low leg capacity −18.945 (.844)** −19.589 (1.004)** −19.274 (.637)**
Medium leg capacity −18.342 (.834)** −18.696 (.966)** −18.013 (.609)**
High leg capacity −17.638 (.719)** −19.445 (1.279)** −17.959 (.001)**
Very high leg capacity – – –
Male .553 (.327) .233 (.446) .608 (.311)*
Female – – –
Intercept 18.139 (.867)** 17.087 (1.058)** 18.431 (.657)**
Model χ2 59.456**
Number of cases 332
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A new sample of legislators was randomly selected from NCSL using the same method as in Study 
1. After attrition (email delivery problems, job turnover), 324 legislators from 33 states remained in 
the sample. As in Study 1, this sample contains proportionally more females in state legislatures 
generally, but is broadly representative (Table 3). Additionally, to avoid overusing deceptive meth-
ods, for Studies 2 and 3 the sample was split so that half of the legislators were randomly assigned 
to receive the well-written email and half the poorly-written one.2
As hypothesized and consistent with the results of Study 1, the well-written email received a sig-
nificantly higher response rate than the poorly-written one. Seventy-one percent of the recipients of 
Email C responded but only 49% of those who received Email D did. A one-way ANOVA using a 
dummy variable for whether the legislator responded as the factor and a condition variable for 
which email they received as the dependent variable indicates that this is a significant difference, 
F(1,332) = 17.045, p < .001. Clearly tempering the quality of the emails from Study 1 did not diminish 
the mean difference, and in fact there was even a slightly larger effect than was found before. Again, 
better writing quality means more responsiveness.
In order to test H2 and H3 a binary logistic regression was estimated using the same control vari-
ables as were used in Study 1. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2(6) = 19.785, 
p = .003 and correctly classified 62% of cases (Table 4). Holding party, gender, education level, 
chamber, and legislative professionalism constant, legislators in the sample were more than twice 
as likely to respond to the well-written email than they were to the poorly-written one. As was found 
in Study 1, but contrary to the predictions in hypotheses 2 and 3, political party and the education 
level of the legislator did not significantly contribute to the model.
Email D
My name is Michael Peterson. Im moving to the area and Im trying to register for voting. I want 






My name is Joseph Anderson. I am moving to your district and I am trying to find out how to 
register to vote. I want to make sure that I can stay involved there, so if you could please let me 
know where to go, I would appreciate it.
Thank you,
Joseph Anderson
Table 3. Univariate statistics for independent variables
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Gender 0 (Male) 1 (Female) .330 .470
Party 0 (Dem) 1 (Rep) .560 .497
Chamber 0 (Senate) 1 (House) .540 .499
Legislative professionalism 1 5 2.730 .977
Education level 1 5 3.960 1.269
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5. Study 3
A potential criticism of the previous two studies is that the emails only indirectly tap the key concept 
of education level. Poor writing may be caused by other things than education per se. Study 3 was 
conducted with the aim of replicating and validating the results of the first two studies using a ma-
nipulation that more directly tests the effect of education on the response rate.
In this study, each email is the same except that one specifies that the writer is a high-school drop-
out (Email E) and the other has a master’s degree (Email F).
A new sample of legislators was randomly selected from NCSL using the same method as in 
Studies 1 and 2. After attrition, 321 legislators from 33 states remained in the sample. This group is 
comprised of 67% males, which is below the national rate of around 76% (t = 3.466, p = .001), and 
56% Republicans, which is descriptive of the broader state legislator population (t = .490, p = .624) 
(see Table 5). Again, the sample was split so that half of the legislators were randomly assigned to 
receive the well-written email and half the poorly-written one.3
In line with the results of Studies 1 and 2, the well-written email received a significantly higher 
response rate than the poorly-written one. Seventy-eight percent of the recipients of Email E re-
sponded but only 57% of those who received Email F did. A one-way ANOVA using a dummy variable 
for whether the legislator responded as the factor and a condition variable for which email they re-
ceived as the dependent variable indicates that this is a significant difference, F(1,319 = 15.486, 
p < .001. This finding supports the simple difference of means tests from the first two studies, but 
Table 4. Binary logistical regression predicting email response
B S.E. Wald DF Sig. Exp(B)
Condition .895 .236 14.362 1 .000 2.448
Party .230 .253 .828 1 .363 1.259
Gender .296 .261 1.282 1 .258 1.344
Education .076 .093 .661 1 .416 1.079
Chamber −.408 .239 2.926 1 .087 .665
Leg professionalism −.011 .125 .008 1 .929 .989
Constant −.401 .548 .534 1 .465 .670
Email E
Dear Senator XXXXX,
I am worried about unemployment in the United States and in our district. I lost my job six 
months ago, and have not been able to find a new one. As someone with a Master’s degree, this 
really worries me. I was wondering what our state is doing to help with unemployment.




I am worried about unemployment in the United States and in our district. I lost my job six 
months ago, and have not been able to find a new one. As someone who dropped out of 
high school, this really worries me. I was wondering what our state is doing to help with 
unemployment.
Thank you very much,
James Holman
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rather than relying on writing quality as a proxy for education it provides a clear and direct cue of 
education level.
A logistic regression model was used to test H2 and H3 chamber, gender, party, education level, 
and legislative capacity as control variables. The model was statistically significant, χ2(6) = 21.760 
p = .001 and correctly classified 70% of cases (Table 6). Holding the control variables constant, leg-
islators in the sample were almost three times more likely to respond to the well-written email than 
they were to the poorly-written one. Similar to the first two studies presented herein but again con-
tradicting Hypotheses 2 and 3, political party and the education level of the legislator did not signifi-
cantly contribute to the model.
6. Discussion of results
The three studies presented in this paper demonstrate a consistent pattern. Constituents with high-
er education levels receive a higher response rate than communication from constituents with lower 
levels. This holds true whether education was measured by proxy through writing level or directly by 
statement in otherwise identical communication
There was a very low overall response rate. It is possible that for Studies 1 and 2 the topic of the 
emails was a confound—if the writer was able to contact the legislator, wouldn’t he have been able 
to find the voter registration information? While it is reasonable to conclude that this may account 
for the low response rate, I contend that it doesn’t account for the difference in the response rates.
Hypothesis 2 posited that due to voting constituency differences Republicans would be more re-
sponsive to the less educated constituents. There was no support for this in the data. In all three 
studies, legislator party identification failed to discriminate the response rate between the emails, 
signifying that even if the theory of statistical discrimination holds true for some demographic char-
acteristics, as has been found in the research, education level (perceived or explicit) is not one of the 
ways in which Democratic legislators dole out their time and attention as compared to Republican 
legislators (or vice versa). Considering the overall low response rate to the less-educated constitu-
ent, statistical discrimination may still be at work—less educated people are simply less likely to turn 
Table 6. Binary logistical regression predicting email response
B S.E. Wald DF Sig. Exp(B)
Condition .994 .253 15.466 1 .000 2.703
Party −.391 .259 2.286 1 .131 .676
Gender −.398 .277 2.069 1 .150 .671
Education −.091 1.00 .828 1 .363 .913
Chamber −.166 .251 .439 1 .508 .847
Leg professionalism −.098 .126 .601 1 .438 .907
Constant 1.462 .590 6.139 1 .013 4.316
Table 5. Univariate statistics for independent variables
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Gender 0 (Male) 1 (Female) .330 .470
Party 0 (Dem) 1 (Rep) .520 .500
Chamber 0 (Senate) 1 (House) .520 .500
Legislative professionalism 1 5 2.741 .984
Education level 1 5 3.903 1.308
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out on Election Day, so they become a lower priority for busy legislators, but not more or less so 
based on political party.
There is also no support for Hypothesis 3 in these data. I had expected that legislators with lower 
relative levels of educational attainment themselves would be sympathetic to, or identify with, con-
stituents with low education levels—much as the research has indicated happens for gender and for 
racial minority groups. This does not seem to be the case. In none of the three studies and the tests 
therein do legislator education levels appear to significantly predict differential responsiveness. This 
is, perhaps, unsurprising. There are individual characteristics that incite entitativity (race and reli-
gion, for example), but there are other characteristics that are simply seen as individual problems. 
Education may, in fact, be one of the latter.
Marx famously commented that the poor would be infinitely more successful in advocating for 
themselves if they realized that they are a cohesive group—not just a bunch of individuals with indi-
vidual problems. He argued that these poor workers simply do not see themselves this way though, 
and that this accounts for the fact that they were losing the battle of capitalism. Schlozman and 
Verba (1979) applied this same principle to the unemployed during the recession of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, finding that though it is commonplace for some groups to join together in order to 
spark change, the unemployed do not.
It is possible that some of the same principles are at play in the present studies. Schlozman and 
Verba discuss several different areas that serve to limit the cohesiveness of the poor: lack of com-
munication between poor individuals (pertaining to action), reluctance to believe that associated 
problems are relevant to government intervention, and efficacy. Simply put, they found that poor 
people see poverty as an individual issue, not a societal one. Further, they tend to believe that there 
is nothing that they can do to effect change on any level greater than their own personal situation. 
Thus, they do not tend to get together to talk about the issue of poverty and potential remedies at a 
societal level.
If we apply those conclusions to this paper, and add that all in to the extremely heterogeneous 
nature of those with lower relative levels of education, it starts to make sense that elected officials 
who did not attend college are not necessarily more motivated to help others with similar education 
levels. Education (or lack thereof) is an individual circumstance—a legislator who did not attend col-
lege but ended up elected to a state legislature simply may not see James Holman who dropped out 
of High School as a comrade. While someone with a PhD might feel an immediate comradery with 
another doctorate-earner and act or advocate on that person’s behalf, the ties that bind at the lower 
echelons might not be as tight. Commiserating over the suffering of dissertating is more entitative 
than the lack of that very thing. And of course, because James and all of the other members of his 
community who also dropped out of High School do not get together to insist that the government 
take action on their behalf, or support particular candidates because those candidates reflect their 
identities, there just may not be enough impetus to motivate a differentiated response.
Overall, these studies indicate that not only do significant numbers of legislators not respond to 
emails that they receive, their response rates differ based on the quality of the initiating email and 
education level of the emailer. While statistical discrimination may make it logical for legislators to 
allocate their time by prioritizing those constituents who are the most likely to vote, and to vote for 
them, there are more serious implications. Individuals with lower levels of education are already 
participating in politics at lower rates than those with more education. Dissatisfaction from govern-
ment officials disinclines participation. Discouraging people with low education levels by not re-
sponding to their inquiries only continues the cycle in which these individuals do not participate.
These results raise concerns that state legislators—the very people elected to serve their constitu-
ents’ interests—are willing to shut some citizens out of the political process. The concerns that gov-
ernment is made up of elitists who care not for the well-being, needs, or desires of the average 
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American may be well founded. It might be surprising to some that harbor this concern that there is 
no one party that is more responsive than the other. Indeed, state legislators from both sides of the 
aisle were not particularly responsive.
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Notes
1. 26.5% responded ONLY to the “good” email, and 9.3% 
ONLY to the “bad” email, so while most of the legislators 
who responded did respond to both constituents, there 
is significant variation.
2. A series of t-tests were perform to test the effectiveness 
of the randomization and indicated that each group was 
not statistically different from the whole sample.
3. t-testing indicated that the groups were not significantly 
different from the larger sample.
References
Bartels, L. (2002). Beyond the running tally: Partisan bias in 
political perceptions. Political Behavior, 24, 117–150. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021226224601
Berinsky, A. J., & Lenz, G. S. (2011). Education and political 
participation: Exploring the causal link. Political Behavior, 
33, 357–373.
Binder, A. J., & Wood, K. (2013). Becoming right: How campuses 
shape young conservatives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Butler, D., & Broockman, D. (2011). Do politicians racially 
discriminate against constituents? A field experiment on 
state legislators. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 
463–477. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.2011.55.issue-3
Cain, B. E., Ferejohn, J. A., & Fiorina, M. P. (1980). Casework 
service in Great Britain and the United States (No. 359).
Cain, B., Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. (1987). The personal vote: 
Constituency service and electoral independence. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Campbell, A. (1980). The American voter. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2004). Women as policy 
makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in 
India. Econometrica, 72, 1409–1443. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecta.2004.72.issue-5
Dahl, R. (1956). A preface to democracy. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Diamond, I. (1977). Sex roles in the state house. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
Dowhower, S. L. (1989). Repeated reading: Research into 
practice. The Reading Teacher, 42, 502–507.
Ericsson, K. A. (2006). The influence of experience and 
deliberate practice on the development of superior expert 
performance. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. J. Feltovich, 
& R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of 
expertise and expert performance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816796
Eulau, H., & Karps, P. (1977). The Puzzle of Representation: 
Specifying Components of Responsiveness. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 2, 233–254. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/439340
Fenno, R. F. (1978). Home style: House members in their 
districts. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Fiorina, M. P. (1974). Representatives, Roll calls, and 
Constituencies. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
Fiorina, M. P. (1977). Congress: Keystone of the Washington 
establishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fraga, L. R. (1992). Latino political incorporation and the Voting 
Rights Act. Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting 
Rights Act in perspective, 278–283.
Frantzich, S. (1986). Write your congressman: Constituent 
communications and representation. New York, NY: 
Praeger.
Freeman, P. K. & Richardson Jr., L. E. (1994). Casework in state 
legislatures. State & Local Government Review, 21–26.
Gilens, M. (2005). Inequality and democratic responsiveness. 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 69, 778–796. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfi058
Graham, S., & Perin, D. (2007). Writing next: Effective strategies 
to improve writing of adolescents in middle and high 
schools—A report to Carnegie corporation of New York. 
Washington, DC: Alliance for Excellent Education.
Griffin, J. D., & Keane, M. (2006). Descriptive representation and 
the composition of African American turnout. American 
Journal of Political Science, 50, 998–1012. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.2006.50.issue-4
Gross, N., & Simmons, S. (2007). The social and political views of 
American professors. Working Paper presented at a 
Harvard University Symposium on Professors and their 
Politics, Cambridge, MA.
Hajnal, Z. L. (2009). Who loses in American democracy? A 
count of votes demonstrates the limited representation of 
African Americans. American Political Science Review, 103, 
37–57.
Hillygus, D. S. (2005). The missing link: Exploring the 
relationship between higher education and political 
engagement. Political Behavior, 27, 25–47.
Horowitz, D. (2007). Indoctrination U: The left’s war against 
academic freedom. New York, NY: Encounter Books.
Jewell, M. E. (1982). Representation in state legislatures. 
Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.
Johannes, J. R. (1984). To serve the people: Congress and 
constituency service. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 
Press.
Kam, C. D., & Palmer, C. L. (2008). Reconsidering the effects of 
education on political participation. The Journal of Politics, 
70, 612–631.
Keefe, W. J., & Ogul, M. S. (1989). The legislative process (7th 
ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Mann, T. E., & Wolfinger, R. E. (1980). Candidates and parties in 
congressional elections. American Political Science Review, 
74, 617–632. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1958145
Mariani, M. D., & Hewitt, G. J. (2008). Indoctrination U.? Faculty 
ideology and changes in student political orientation. PS: 
Political Science & Politics, 41, 773–783. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096508081031
Mattern, K. D., & Shaw, E. J. (2010). A look beyond cognitive 
predictors of academic success: Understanding the 
relationship between academic self-beliefs and outcomes. 
Denver, CO: American Educational Research Association.
Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Newell, A., & Rosenbloom, P. S. (1981). Mechanisms of skill 
acquisition and the law of practice. Cognitive skills and 
their acquisition, 1, 1–55.
Page 12 of 12
Neiman, Cogent Social Sciences (2017), 3: 1282034
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1282034
© 2017 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license.
You are free to: 
Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format  
Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.  
You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.  
No additional restrictions  
You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Cogent Social Sciences (ISSN: 2331-1886) is published by Cogent OA, part of Taylor & Francis Group. 
Publishing with Cogent OA ensures:
• Immediate, universal access to your article on publication
• High visibility and discoverability via the Cogent OA website as well as Taylor & Francis Online
• Download and citation statistics for your article
• Rapid online publication
• Input from, and dialog with, expert editors and editorial boards
• Retention of full copyright of your article
• Guaranteed legacy preservation of your article
• Discounts and waivers for authors in developing regions
Submit your manuscript to a Cogent OA journal at www.CogentOA.com
Nie, N. H., Junn, J., & Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). Education and 
democratic citizenship in America. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Parker, G. R. (1986). Homeward bound: Explaining changes in 
congressional behavior. Pittsburg, CA: University of 
Pittsburg Press.
Patterson, S. C. (1990). State legislators and the legislatures. In 
V. Gray, H. Jacob, & R. B. Albritton (Eds.), Politics and the 
American states (5th ed.). Glenview, IL: Little Brown.
Pew Research Center. (2014). Party identification trends, 1992–
2014. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.
org/2015/04/07/
party-identification-trends-1992-2014/#education
Phillips, A. (1995). The politics of presence. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Pitkin, H. (1967/1972). The concept of representation. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press.
Rasicot, J. (2012, February 23). Early writing skills predict later 




Richardson, L. E., & Freeman, P. K. (1995). Gender differences in 
constituency service among state legislators. Political 
Research Quarterly, 48, 169–179. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106591299504800110
Rosenthal, A. (1981). Legislative life. New York, NY: Harper and 
Row.
Rosenthal, A. (1993). The legislative institution—In transition 
and at risk. In C. E. Van Horn (Ed.), The state of the states 
(2nd ed., pp. 115–148). Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly Press.
Rosenstone, S., & Hansen, J. (1993). Mobilization, participation, 
and American democracy. New York, NY: McMillan.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman. (2002). Citizen participation in 
America. In Ira Katznelson & Helen Milner (Eds.), Political 
science: The state of the discipline. New York, NY: Norton.
Schlozman, K. & Verba, S. (1979). Insult to Injury. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
Serra, G., & Moon, D. (1994). Casework, issue positions, and 
voting in congressional elections: A district analysis. The 
Journal of Politics, 56, 200–213. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2132353
Stoker, L., & Jennings, M. K. (2008). Of time and the 
development of partisan polarization. American Journal of 
Political Science, 52, 619–635. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.2008.52.issue-3
Thernstrom, A. M. (1987). Whose votes count?: Affirmative 
action and minority voting rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Thomas, S. (1992). The effects of race and gender on 
constituency service. Western Political Quarterly, 45, 
169–180.
Verba, S. (2003). Would the dream of political equality turn out 
to be a nightmare? Perspectives on politics, 1, 663–679.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H. E., & Brady, H. E. (1995). 
Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics 
(Vol. 4). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wagner, M. W. (2007). Beyond policy representation in the U.S. 
house: Partisanship, polarization, and citizens’ attitudes 
about casework. American Politics Research, 35, 771–789. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X07299867
Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). Who votes? (Vol. 
22). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Yiannakis, D. E. (1981). The grateful electorate: Casework and 
congressional elections. American Journal of Political 
Science, 25, 568–580. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2110819
